Against the Academicians, Third Dialogue [12, Nov. 386]

Augustine tries to mediate (maybe, soothe some ego?) by offering up Cicero's definition of wisdom: "the knowledge of human and divine matters" (from the Tusculan Disputationes). Licentius immediately seizes on this definition by asking why we don't call him wise the disreputable man who frequents prostitutes even though he gives good advice? (One may ask, really, Licentius, that's the best example you have?)

What follows is a series of exempla in which Albicerius (our prostitute-goer) gives so-called wise answers. The question threaded throughout: did he have knowledge in these situations and what is knowledge, anyway? Augustine interjects by defining knowledge as a process (!). Take that Licentius. Knowledge, says Augustine, is not merely in the matter apprehended; it is also in the way they are apprehended "in such a way that nobody should be in error about it or vacillate when pressed by opponents"--so for Augustine it is both the matter and the how one got there. Augustine dismisses Albicerius, not only because of his prostitute-going, but because sometimes he was wrong. He is wrong because he is seer. Now, this seems to come out of nowhere--first, he is attacking Albicerius since his answers feel like luck, and, then, it's because of the profession. Augustine has no time for this type of cheap conjurer of tricks. (but maybe Augustine is mistaken?) As well, the definitional discussion continues on what exactly "human matters" of knowledge even are.  In this play-by-play then, Augustine has moved from defining knowledge, hearing out an example of someone who is perceived as having knowledge, and then, undercutting those examples by suggesting that what Albicerius is producing is not knowledge, he's just lucky, and on top of that he is a seer and frequenter of brothels. The notes report that we do not know who Albicerius was, but we can gather that since this dialogue (verging on monologue, really) has spent so much time on Albicerius that he must have been a bit of a celebrity and someone Augustine really wants to take down.

For Augustine, then, knowledge is not facts (how many farms, who wrote a poem)--he would be ultra-dismissive of the people claiming smarts at any trivia-night across the country. Knowledge is what knows value: the light of prudence, the splendor of moderation, the strength of courage, the sanctity of justice. These are the examples he provides. So wisdom is a kind of discernment of the value of values, the ephemeral qualities of a virtue.

Rote memorization is not knowledge, then. (This makes me think of The Wizard of Oz. The Wizard tells the Scarecrow: "Why, anybody can have a brain. That's a very mediocre commodity. Every pusillanimous creature that crawls on the Earth or slinks through slimy seas has a brain. Back where I come from, we have universities, seats of great learning, where men go to become great thinkers. And when they come out, they think deep thoughts and with no more brains than you have. But they have one thing you haven't got: a diploma." Ha!) Augustine stops for a moment to consider bee-knowledge: watching a bee flit from flower to flower exhibits a "sagacity" beyond human comprehension. There are other types of knowledge out there, he admits. Humans can't or do not think with bee-thoughts (we might ask, with Augustine and contemporary animal theorists, how might we enact bee-knowledge or can we? Considering problems of bee-colony collapse, it might be worth a think).

Augustine then passes on to defining divine matters. Divine matters are not reached through the senses (something he posited in the early dedication). He dismisses Albicerius as a diviner who looks at stars and thinks they tell him of divine things. But, of course, this is apprehending with sensual knowledge, not intellectual knowledge (a distinction Augustine is making, one I'm not sure I agree with). And this is truly why Albicerius is not a good example of someone who is wise. The intellectual search is the only way to reach divine matters.

More debate occurs on whether Albicerius is wise--short answer: no. And we have further refinement of our definition of wisdom, as well. Licentius puts forth: wisodm is not only knowlegde, but the search for knowledge that is relevant to a happy life. That which embraces knowledge belongs to God, the search belongs to humans. God is happy in the former (as a spiritual embodiment of knowledge?) while humans are in the latter. This seems to come out of left field (we haven't seen happiness in awhile, for one)--because this seems to be the most explicit reference to God, yet. As well, by extension, if we embrace knowledge, have we become God (like God, god-like, gods??)

What follows in the dialogue, then, is a summary put forth by Augustine of the moves we've been discussing here. Licentius has landed where Augustine wanted, it would seem, and the dialogue on truth, knowledge, and wisdom is, purportedly, going to be left behind. Where has Trygetius gone to? (maybe off to get the beer).

The key discussion in these three debates is the emphasis on the search. Like a dialogue itself, the art of conversation is revelatory. Although, in the end Licentius has named God as the destination, knowledge is something found through wisdom--and this finding-through-wisdom is happy life. The threads are connecting here. Part of this happiness is tranquility. The path of wisdom causes a tranquil mind; tranquility leads to happiness (or maybe even equated with it).