Augustine begins by pointing out that a man is in error when he follows the false path. Those who are in error are not necessarily sinners, but those in sin are in error. Augustine attacks the Academicians through the example of adultery--if found guilty he either was in error and sinned or error and sin are two different things because one didn't assent to the truth (or didn't assent to the adultery?): in other words, since I did not assent to anything I can't be in sin--Augustine calls this a monstrosity. In Academician-think then anything is permissible because they assent to nothing--without the assent they are not committing either an error or crime. The rest of the world would think this is absurd.
Augustine then appeals to Platonic thinking to critique the world of the Academicians. The intelligible world is where the truth resides, while the sensual world seems truthlike. In a soul that knows itself, the truth would reveal itself brightly [3.17].
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION
Augustine concludes that whatever human wisdom is he hasn't seen it yet since he is only 33. He concedes that the Academicians have held him up, but he's past that now and will listen to Christ. He will find truth using the Platonists. Alypius reports that he is happy to leave the dispute a happy man. Augustine then finishes by encouraging them to pick up Cicero's Academia to try and get Alypius to take up Augustine's place and defends his points against Cicero, too. The debate ends with a laugh and some relief that it was resolved so calmly.
Sunday, October 19, 2014
Sunday, October 12, 2014
Book 3 (continued) [21 November 380] Post-meal
They return from the meal to find Licentius composing poetry. During the meal, Licentius has got up to sing. Augustine wishes him well in his pursuit of poetics, but wishes he would spend more time on philosophy.
Augustine and Alypius get back into their argument again: does the wise man know that he knows wisdom? Alypius tries the "seems" trick again, but Augutine doesn't bite. So Alypius agrees that a wise man knows wisdom--by definition. Augustine then asks if "the wise man can be found?" [3.4.10]. If he can't be found then the debate is over, but if he can be found, all questions are settled (presumably not the "how?" however).
For Augustine what this means is that either wisdom can't be identified, and that it is nothing, or that reason, as configured in the human mind, can't detect wisdom. Alypius counters that this does not mean the whole project of the Academicians should be thrown out, their withholding of assent is still important.
Assent should not be given because someday the position one holds now can be proven false, argues Alypius. Augustine rebuts that Alypius has just proven his point that the Academicians are beat. Augustine asks--will the Academicians say you should not assent to the truth? No, they would say that the truth can be found (and if found, assented to). To find the truth, then, one must be guided by divine spirit (something Alypius said back in 3.5). Augustine returns to poetry and the image of Proteus. Proteus, in Virgil's Georgics, is a figure of truth. Proteus reminds us not to be deceived by false images nor deceived through the senses. Augustine is happy that they agree so much using Cicero's definition of frienship as "accord," he finishes by launching into a monologue.
AUGUSTINE'S MONOLOGUE
Augustine first critiques the pomposity of the Academicians.
He then moves on to critique the idea that we can't know anything by suggesting that even if we are uncertain, we still know something.
Augustine then argues that even though the Academicians argue that perception is misleading we are not wrong when we identify what we see as world. So, what seems so to us is world. Augustine argues here for a kind of univocity in that even if we are asleep or insane we are both of these things in world. The world gives us information mediated by laws--so seeing a bent bar in the water is truth because the water effects the bar and gives us certain kinds of visual information--it seems bent. If it appeared straight, we would say this is false (though what Augustine is not exactly explaining is how we know that the visual trick of the water's refracting powers is truth to begin with). Augustine calls these things that interfere as ""intervening causes"--so seeing things refracted is not "wrong" because we know about intervening causes. In other words, it doesn't seem right, but it is because of these intervening causes. Truth is external to our biases.
The senses, then, give us kinds of truth. But, Augustine asks what do they contribute to our search for truth? Augustine argues that individual senses will always give pleasure or displeasure to the individual but the highest good will still be found with the mind.
Augustine then defends dialectics in finding truth. A man can't be happy and sad. If there is one sun, then, there can't be two. The same soul couldn't not die and be immortal. Augustine returns to the problem of the Academicians and perception as it relates to wisdom. A simplified version would run: if a wise man identified something as wisdom, why would he say no to it? A wise man is assenting to more than "mere opinion" [3.14]. Wisdom isn't nothing.
Augustine goes on to argue that someone who assents to nothing, does nothing. This is a similar argument in Dante's Inferno with the Neutrals. These people did nothing in life, they stood still. In death, they are wanted neither by Heaven nor Hell and condemned to always be in motion--stung by wasps and flies, following a blank banner. For Dante, it would have been better if they would have chosen Hell than to have done nothing in life. Dante laments that there are so many. For Augustine, as well, this constant deferring of assent is as good as standing still. One must assent as part of the search for wisdom.
I'll conclude with Against the Academicians in the next post.
Augustine and Alypius get back into their argument again: does the wise man know that he knows wisdom? Alypius tries the "seems" trick again, but Augutine doesn't bite. So Alypius agrees that a wise man knows wisdom--by definition. Augustine then asks if "the wise man can be found?" [3.4.10]. If he can't be found then the debate is over, but if he can be found, all questions are settled (presumably not the "how?" however).
For Augustine what this means is that either wisdom can't be identified, and that it is nothing, or that reason, as configured in the human mind, can't detect wisdom. Alypius counters that this does not mean the whole project of the Academicians should be thrown out, their withholding of assent is still important.
Assent should not be given because someday the position one holds now can be proven false, argues Alypius. Augustine rebuts that Alypius has just proven his point that the Academicians are beat. Augustine asks--will the Academicians say you should not assent to the truth? No, they would say that the truth can be found (and if found, assented to). To find the truth, then, one must be guided by divine spirit (something Alypius said back in 3.5). Augustine returns to poetry and the image of Proteus. Proteus, in Virgil's Georgics, is a figure of truth. Proteus reminds us not to be deceived by false images nor deceived through the senses. Augustine is happy that they agree so much using Cicero's definition of frienship as "accord," he finishes by launching into a monologue.
AUGUSTINE'S MONOLOGUE
Augustine first critiques the pomposity of the Academicians.
He then moves on to critique the idea that we can't know anything by suggesting that even if we are uncertain, we still know something.
Augustine then argues that even though the Academicians argue that perception is misleading we are not wrong when we identify what we see as world. So, what seems so to us is world. Augustine argues here for a kind of univocity in that even if we are asleep or insane we are both of these things in world. The world gives us information mediated by laws--so seeing a bent bar in the water is truth because the water effects the bar and gives us certain kinds of visual information--it seems bent. If it appeared straight, we would say this is false (though what Augustine is not exactly explaining is how we know that the visual trick of the water's refracting powers is truth to begin with). Augustine calls these things that interfere as ""intervening causes"--so seeing things refracted is not "wrong" because we know about intervening causes. In other words, it doesn't seem right, but it is because of these intervening causes. Truth is external to our biases.
The senses, then, give us kinds of truth. But, Augustine asks what do they contribute to our search for truth? Augustine argues that individual senses will always give pleasure or displeasure to the individual but the highest good will still be found with the mind.
Augustine then defends dialectics in finding truth. A man can't be happy and sad. If there is one sun, then, there can't be two. The same soul couldn't not die and be immortal. Augustine returns to the problem of the Academicians and perception as it relates to wisdom. A simplified version would run: if a wise man identified something as wisdom, why would he say no to it? A wise man is assenting to more than "mere opinion" [3.14]. Wisdom isn't nothing.
Augustine goes on to argue that someone who assents to nothing, does nothing. This is a similar argument in Dante's Inferno with the Neutrals. These people did nothing in life, they stood still. In death, they are wanted neither by Heaven nor Hell and condemned to always be in motion--stung by wasps and flies, following a blank banner. For Dante, it would have been better if they would have chosen Hell than to have done nothing in life. Dante laments that there are so many. For Augustine, as well, this constant deferring of assent is as good as standing still. One must assent as part of the search for wisdom.
I'll conclude with Against the Academicians in the next post.
Thursday, October 9, 2014
Against the Academicians Book 3 [21 November 380]
I have been away from the blog for a bit; I got inundated with papers. The teaching life.
Book 3 is the longest and final book, so I am going to divide this into two, especially as there is a break for a meal about half way through the dialogue.
Augustine reports that they have come to the baths because the weather is inclement. [I love these comments because the life of the mind is so affected and entangled with the world--I feel like Augustine is making a nod to this.] He begins the discussion by appealing to search "wholeheartedly" for the truth.
The problem, he reiterates, is that the Academicians hold that the truth is so hidden that the wise-man only holds on to what is "truth-like."
They then move into a discussion of fortune. Is fortune necessary in the pursuit of wisdom? If I am unfortunate (and the examples of being blind or death are provided) would I pursue wisdom or could one? Alypius slips away and argues that if he did not have the fortune of life, he would not care for wisdom. At face value, this seems obvious, if one were dead, caring about anything is a moot point. Augustine uses this as a spring-board to argue for the difference between the seeker of wisdom (the philosopher) and the wise (one who holds wisdom). Fortune wouldn't necessarily get in the way of the seeker or the owner of wisdom. Because wisdom is greater than fortune.
Augustine then posits these 4 points: 1) there is no difference between seeker and owner except for the act of possession itself; 2) nobody can possess wisdom if they haven't learned (so, wisdom is a something, not a nothing); 3) anyone who knows nothing; learns nothing; and 4) nobody can know a falsehood. This last point is a sticky one for me--of course one can know something false. But, I think what they are advocating here is that wisdom would be something outside of the knower themselves--human error does not make something false, if it is true (or real?)
Alypius objects on the grounds of "possession;" he wants to advocate for "seeming" to. Augustine gets irritated with these semantics--to seem, he says, would indeed indicate some kind of possession. If he seems to know, then there is a something, not a nothing.
Alypius tries to pursue the gray area. He insists there is a difference between "it seems to him that he knows" and "he knows." As well, he argues, there is a difference between wisdom connected with the truth and truth itself.
Augustine, perhaps with his back to the wall here, introduces a convenient noon day meal. They adjourn and return. Book 3 has no breaks, so in the next blog I will pick up with the post-meal discussion.
Book 3 is the longest and final book, so I am going to divide this into two, especially as there is a break for a meal about half way through the dialogue.
Augustine reports that they have come to the baths because the weather is inclement. [I love these comments because the life of the mind is so affected and entangled with the world--I feel like Augustine is making a nod to this.] He begins the discussion by appealing to search "wholeheartedly" for the truth.
The problem, he reiterates, is that the Academicians hold that the truth is so hidden that the wise-man only holds on to what is "truth-like."
They then move into a discussion of fortune. Is fortune necessary in the pursuit of wisdom? If I am unfortunate (and the examples of being blind or death are provided) would I pursue wisdom or could one? Alypius slips away and argues that if he did not have the fortune of life, he would not care for wisdom. At face value, this seems obvious, if one were dead, caring about anything is a moot point. Augustine uses this as a spring-board to argue for the difference between the seeker of wisdom (the philosopher) and the wise (one who holds wisdom). Fortune wouldn't necessarily get in the way of the seeker or the owner of wisdom. Because wisdom is greater than fortune.
Augustine then posits these 4 points: 1) there is no difference between seeker and owner except for the act of possession itself; 2) nobody can possess wisdom if they haven't learned (so, wisdom is a something, not a nothing); 3) anyone who knows nothing; learns nothing; and 4) nobody can know a falsehood. This last point is a sticky one for me--of course one can know something false. But, I think what they are advocating here is that wisdom would be something outside of the knower themselves--human error does not make something false, if it is true (or real?)
Alypius objects on the grounds of "possession;" he wants to advocate for "seeming" to. Augustine gets irritated with these semantics--to seem, he says, would indeed indicate some kind of possession. If he seems to know, then there is a something, not a nothing.
Alypius tries to pursue the gray area. He insists there is a difference between "it seems to him that he knows" and "he knows." As well, he argues, there is a difference between wisdom connected with the truth and truth itself.
Augustine, perhaps with his back to the wall here, introduces a convenient noon day meal. They adjourn and return. Book 3 has no breaks, so in the next blog I will pick up with the post-meal discussion.
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