I have been away from the blog for a bit; I got inundated with papers. The teaching life.
Book 3 is the longest and final book, so I am going to divide this into two, especially as there is a break for a meal about half way through the dialogue.
Augustine reports that they have come to the baths because the weather is inclement. [I love these comments because the life of the mind is so affected and entangled with the world--I feel like Augustine is making a nod to this.] He begins the discussion by appealing to search "wholeheartedly" for the truth.
The problem, he reiterates, is that the Academicians hold that the truth is so hidden that the wise-man only holds on to what is "truth-like."
They then move into a discussion of fortune. Is fortune necessary in the pursuit of wisdom? If I am unfortunate (and the examples of being blind or death are provided) would I pursue wisdom or could one? Alypius slips away and argues that if he did not have the fortune of life, he would not care for wisdom. At face value, this seems obvious, if one were dead, caring about anything is a moot point. Augustine uses this as a spring-board to argue for the difference between the seeker of wisdom (the philosopher) and the wise (one who holds wisdom). Fortune wouldn't necessarily get in the way of the seeker or the owner of wisdom. Because wisdom is greater than fortune.
Augustine then posits these 4 points: 1) there is no difference between seeker and owner except for the act of possession itself; 2) nobody can possess wisdom if they haven't learned (so, wisdom is a something, not a nothing); 3) anyone who knows nothing; learns nothing; and 4) nobody can know a falsehood. This last point is a sticky one for me--of course one can know something false. But, I think what they are advocating here is that wisdom would be something outside of the knower themselves--human error does not make something false, if it is true (or real?)
Alypius objects on the grounds of "possession;" he wants to advocate for "seeming" to. Augustine gets irritated with these semantics--to seem, he says, would indeed indicate some kind of possession. If he seems to know, then there is a something, not a nothing.
Alypius tries to pursue the gray area. He insists there is a difference between "it seems to him that he knows" and "he knows." As well, he argues, there is a difference between wisdom connected with the truth and truth itself.
Augustine, perhaps with his back to the wall here, introduces a convenient noon day meal. They adjourn and return. Book 3 has no breaks, so in the next blog I will pick up with the post-meal discussion.
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