This discussion ends with Augustine wondering where they are going with this discussion in the first place and wanting to assure Adeodatus that the exercise of the mind--even if it is in "play" is a sign of good.
Although this is a transhistorical comment, I could not help but think about how this discussion is a comment that resonates with our own age and the larger discussion about the purpose and decline of the humanities (and the university itself). What will become of university life as the push in higher education becomes more about careerism and training for work and less about a larger sense of the life of the mind--admittedly I am making a class-based comment for who can afford to pursue the life of the mind, as it is so called, except the affluent. But, I'm not sure that just because the practice of the life of the mind has trickled down from the privileged class that something at the heart of it should necessarily be abandoned. There is value to the the critical question, the investigative gaze, the refusal to bend to work (or capitalist) time by losing oneself in the book. To create, to make, to innovate--these are qualities of a life of the mind. I'm not sure how simple job training may allow one to do these things.
As we become more conversant only in small bites, i.e. twitter-speak or texting, the critical question becomes can we have longer and larger conversations that the life of the mind wants to ensure. I am certainly not a Luddite, I love texting, social media, etc., but I am also aware that the conversations I've had over a pot of coffee in an afternoon are much more enriching than a conversation that occurs and is often misunderstood over a text. Over the course of reading Augustine's dialogue, it is pointed to note that these conversations occur over days. They pickup where they leave off and, although Augustine is representing these dialogues to prove his own point, what he is unable to obscure is the good, the companionship, the bonding that occurs over the course of the conversation.
As Augustine phrases it, "to exercise the mind's strength and sharpness, with which we're able to not only withstand but also to love the heat of life of the region where the happy life is" (122).
As to this discussion regarding signs, the dialogue in this section boils down signification and how it comes in three forms. There are signs that cannot be signified by the signs they signify (conjunctions); there are those that do signify what they sign. They further divide this kind of signification into general and specific signification. This category distinction has to do with how the word "word" follows under the general definition of "sign" but means specifically linguistic signs and not, say, pictograms. Sign means "more" than "word" in terms of its ability to signify.
They will, of course, parse this further in the next section.
Monday, July 20, 2015
Wednesday, July 15, 2015
The Teacher, Part Two: The Nature of Signs
The discussion continues with an agreement: words are signs.
Adeodatus and Augustine unpack the meaning of the sentence: "if nothing from so great a city it pleases the gods be left...". The conversation becomes stuck on the word "nothing." How can a word signify "no" thing if, by the very definition, it has to signify something?
What strikes me here is that they are practicing a very slow, very intense close reading, but predicating that each word must signify an object. This is going to be important for Augustine later in the debate so that he prove that words are misleading (and by extension words are necessary for faith). Augustine runs into problems with the word "nothing." To get out of this sticky wicket they include "states of mind" as also being signified in words.
As they unpack the sentence, they also come up with these rules of signification and what we don't necessarily need to signify:
a) things we are not doing when we are asked about them and can do them on the spot (without signs--and this aspect is going to come back in future discussions).
b) the very signs we happen to be doing (for example, walking).
This then turns to a discussion about the division of signs themselves which I will deal with in the next blog.
Adeodatus and Augustine unpack the meaning of the sentence: "if nothing from so great a city it pleases the gods be left...". The conversation becomes stuck on the word "nothing." How can a word signify "no" thing if, by the very definition, it has to signify something?
What strikes me here is that they are practicing a very slow, very intense close reading, but predicating that each word must signify an object. This is going to be important for Augustine later in the debate so that he prove that words are misleading (and by extension words are necessary for faith). Augustine runs into problems with the word "nothing." To get out of this sticky wicket they include "states of mind" as also being signified in words.
As they unpack the sentence, they also come up with these rules of signification and what we don't necessarily need to signify:
a) things we are not doing when we are asked about them and can do them on the spot (without signs--and this aspect is going to come back in future discussions).
b) the very signs we happen to be doing (for example, walking).
This then turns to a discussion about the division of signs themselves which I will deal with in the next blog.
Monday, July 6, 2015
The Teacher, Part One: The Purpose of Language
This debate is between Augustine and his 16-year-old son, Adeodatus. The edited edition I am using divides the dialogue into specific themes and topics. I'll follow that pattern in the blog posts.
Part One: The Purpose of Language
The debate opens with a discussion of the purpose of speaking. Adeodatus posits that to speak is to teach or learn. Augustine does not agree. For him, teaching is the purpose of speaking. Adeodatus argues that one is not necessarily teaching when one is singing. So, Augustine puts an amend on it--how about the purpose of language is to teach AND to remind ourselves (spoiler: this is going to be his conclusion, as well).
Augustine side-steps Adeodatus' challenge by suggesting that singing and speaking are two different things and that singing sometimes does not involve words (for example, bird singing). Thus, speaking words is for teaching and reminding. Adeodatus agrees. What Augustine seems to be missing here is how birds may actually be using singing. Singing is not merely aesthetic, which Augustine seems to be implying. But, he leaves behind the problem of singing to pursue speech itself.
Prayer, though, is not speaking. It happens in the mind because God does not need teaching (and Augustine will posit later on that God is the only true teacher, we're, at best, mimes). Prayer happens in the "inner man"--in the "bedchamber of the heart" and the "temple of the mind" so there is no need for speaking in prayer. Thus, when Jesus taught the disciples, he was teaching then the words to pray with. Thus when we pray, we are not teaching but "reminding" ourselves of Jesus--thus "the words are signs come to mind." Augustine concludes then that prayer is a kind of internal speaking, not external, used to remind ourselves, not teach God.
In this initial section, I can sense Augustine's need to think about the purpose of words. In later sections, he will expound on thinking about signification of words and their use and how this effects speech, knowledge, and learning.
Part One: The Purpose of Language
The debate opens with a discussion of the purpose of speaking. Adeodatus posits that to speak is to teach or learn. Augustine does not agree. For him, teaching is the purpose of speaking. Adeodatus argues that one is not necessarily teaching when one is singing. So, Augustine puts an amend on it--how about the purpose of language is to teach AND to remind ourselves (spoiler: this is going to be his conclusion, as well).
Augustine side-steps Adeodatus' challenge by suggesting that singing and speaking are two different things and that singing sometimes does not involve words (for example, bird singing). Thus, speaking words is for teaching and reminding. Adeodatus agrees. What Augustine seems to be missing here is how birds may actually be using singing. Singing is not merely aesthetic, which Augustine seems to be implying. But, he leaves behind the problem of singing to pursue speech itself.
Prayer, though, is not speaking. It happens in the mind because God does not need teaching (and Augustine will posit later on that God is the only true teacher, we're, at best, mimes). Prayer happens in the "inner man"--in the "bedchamber of the heart" and the "temple of the mind" so there is no need for speaking in prayer. Thus, when Jesus taught the disciples, he was teaching then the words to pray with. Thus when we pray, we are not teaching but "reminding" ourselves of Jesus--thus "the words are signs come to mind." Augustine concludes then that prayer is a kind of internal speaking, not external, used to remind ourselves, not teach God.
In this initial section, I can sense Augustine's need to think about the purpose of words. In later sections, he will expound on thinking about signification of words and their use and how this effects speech, knowledge, and learning.
Monday, June 29, 2015
Peter Brown: The Body and Society, Chapter 19. "Augustine: Sexuality and Society"
A bit of a hiatus, but hoping to continue with this blog a little more semi-regularly. Today's post will deal with some work on Augustine to live-up to my initial concept for this blog, which was to compile commentary on all aspects of Augustine, even commentary on commentary.
Brown ends his magisterial study of sexuality in early Christianity with a chapter on Augustine's work. Brown argues that sexuality and virginity were variously regarded by early Church Fathers who were affected by their audience, social class, as well as how solid a foothold Christianity had on a local level. For Brown, Augustine is the end of an era. Augustine is a figure who must struggle with an active sexuality. Marriage was not an option for hum, so his early life is marked by life with a concubine with whom he fathered a child. Once Augustine renounces sexuality, as Brown phrases it, he is "free to serve God" (388).
Brown points out that male friendship was where "deeper" satisfactions were found. Calling him a "young professor on the make" Augustine was faithful to his concubine, but his marginal social class in Carthage left hm little options in terms of relationships. The relationship with his concubine was "frankly sexual" (390) and the fact that they had only one child in thirteen years indicates to Brown that they must have practiced birth control.
Augustine's sexual experience influences his theological thinking in a very explicit way (perhaps, more so considering Brown's discussion of the other Church Fathers). Brown interprets Augustine's use of sexual love to show how much we have fallen. Sexual love is a shadow or "leaden shadow" (394) of sex in Paradise. Augustine doesn't get too hung up on virginity and sexuality like figures such as Jerome, for Augustine death in the form of martyrdom is a greater thing than conquering sexuality through virginity.
What is perhaps the most interesting element of Augustine's theology in Brown's work, and one I relish to read more about throughout this project, is Augustine's reading of Adam and Eve. Rather than situate Adam and Eve in a time of distant past, even in a mode that is so different than our own, Augustine insists that sex, marriage, even society, are "not alien to the original definition of humanity" (399). Rather, God had created Adam and Even for "the joys of society" (400). Augustine's exegesis reflects Adam and Eve as familiar with the form of society. Thus, Adam and Eve were already fully sexual beings.
Sexual drive post-Fall, however, indicates how the soul is out of whack with the body. The sexual will shows us how "disruptive" the Fall is to our world. As Brown writes, "Augustine never found a way, any more than any of his contemporaries, of articulating the possibility that sexual pleasure might in itself, enrich the relationship between husband and wife" (402).
Marriage, for Augustine, was a sign that men and women could live in concord. But, death is unnatural--death reveals how the soul wants to be with the body. Another sign that the body and soul are aligned as they were in Prelapsarian Eden. Augustine's ideal was the body, the soul and society living harmoniously and not twisted by the fallen will (407).
I'm looking forward to further insights from Brown in his biography of Augustine. It is on the stack.
Brown ends his magisterial study of sexuality in early Christianity with a chapter on Augustine's work. Brown argues that sexuality and virginity were variously regarded by early Church Fathers who were affected by their audience, social class, as well as how solid a foothold Christianity had on a local level. For Brown, Augustine is the end of an era. Augustine is a figure who must struggle with an active sexuality. Marriage was not an option for hum, so his early life is marked by life with a concubine with whom he fathered a child. Once Augustine renounces sexuality, as Brown phrases it, he is "free to serve God" (388).
Brown points out that male friendship was where "deeper" satisfactions were found. Calling him a "young professor on the make" Augustine was faithful to his concubine, but his marginal social class in Carthage left hm little options in terms of relationships. The relationship with his concubine was "frankly sexual" (390) and the fact that they had only one child in thirteen years indicates to Brown that they must have practiced birth control.
Augustine's sexual experience influences his theological thinking in a very explicit way (perhaps, more so considering Brown's discussion of the other Church Fathers). Brown interprets Augustine's use of sexual love to show how much we have fallen. Sexual love is a shadow or "leaden shadow" (394) of sex in Paradise. Augustine doesn't get too hung up on virginity and sexuality like figures such as Jerome, for Augustine death in the form of martyrdom is a greater thing than conquering sexuality through virginity.
What is perhaps the most interesting element of Augustine's theology in Brown's work, and one I relish to read more about throughout this project, is Augustine's reading of Adam and Eve. Rather than situate Adam and Eve in a time of distant past, even in a mode that is so different than our own, Augustine insists that sex, marriage, even society, are "not alien to the original definition of humanity" (399). Rather, God had created Adam and Even for "the joys of society" (400). Augustine's exegesis reflects Adam and Eve as familiar with the form of society. Thus, Adam and Eve were already fully sexual beings.
Sexual drive post-Fall, however, indicates how the soul is out of whack with the body. The sexual will shows us how "disruptive" the Fall is to our world. As Brown writes, "Augustine never found a way, any more than any of his contemporaries, of articulating the possibility that sexual pleasure might in itself, enrich the relationship between husband and wife" (402).
Marriage, for Augustine, was a sign that men and women could live in concord. But, death is unnatural--death reveals how the soul wants to be with the body. Another sign that the body and soul are aligned as they were in Prelapsarian Eden. Augustine's ideal was the body, the soul and society living harmoniously and not twisted by the fallen will (407).
I'm looking forward to further insights from Brown in his biography of Augustine. It is on the stack.
Sunday, October 19, 2014
Against the Academicians [Book 3] Conclusion
Augustine begins by pointing out that a man is in error when he follows the false path. Those who are in error are not necessarily sinners, but those in sin are in error. Augustine attacks the Academicians through the example of adultery--if found guilty he either was in error and sinned or error and sin are two different things because one didn't assent to the truth (or didn't assent to the adultery?): in other words, since I did not assent to anything I can't be in sin--Augustine calls this a monstrosity. In Academician-think then anything is permissible because they assent to nothing--without the assent they are not committing either an error or crime. The rest of the world would think this is absurd.
Augustine then appeals to Platonic thinking to critique the world of the Academicians. The intelligible world is where the truth resides, while the sensual world seems truthlike. In a soul that knows itself, the truth would reveal itself brightly [3.17].
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION
Augustine concludes that whatever human wisdom is he hasn't seen it yet since he is only 33. He concedes that the Academicians have held him up, but he's past that now and will listen to Christ. He will find truth using the Platonists. Alypius reports that he is happy to leave the dispute a happy man. Augustine then finishes by encouraging them to pick up Cicero's Academia to try and get Alypius to take up Augustine's place and defends his points against Cicero, too. The debate ends with a laugh and some relief that it was resolved so calmly.
Augustine then appeals to Platonic thinking to critique the world of the Academicians. The intelligible world is where the truth resides, while the sensual world seems truthlike. In a soul that knows itself, the truth would reveal itself brightly [3.17].
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION
Augustine concludes that whatever human wisdom is he hasn't seen it yet since he is only 33. He concedes that the Academicians have held him up, but he's past that now and will listen to Christ. He will find truth using the Platonists. Alypius reports that he is happy to leave the dispute a happy man. Augustine then finishes by encouraging them to pick up Cicero's Academia to try and get Alypius to take up Augustine's place and defends his points against Cicero, too. The debate ends with a laugh and some relief that it was resolved so calmly.
Sunday, October 12, 2014
Book 3 (continued) [21 November 380] Post-meal
They return from the meal to find Licentius composing poetry. During the meal, Licentius has got up to sing. Augustine wishes him well in his pursuit of poetics, but wishes he would spend more time on philosophy.
Augustine and Alypius get back into their argument again: does the wise man know that he knows wisdom? Alypius tries the "seems" trick again, but Augutine doesn't bite. So Alypius agrees that a wise man knows wisdom--by definition. Augustine then asks if "the wise man can be found?" [3.4.10]. If he can't be found then the debate is over, but if he can be found, all questions are settled (presumably not the "how?" however).
For Augustine what this means is that either wisdom can't be identified, and that it is nothing, or that reason, as configured in the human mind, can't detect wisdom. Alypius counters that this does not mean the whole project of the Academicians should be thrown out, their withholding of assent is still important.
Assent should not be given because someday the position one holds now can be proven false, argues Alypius. Augustine rebuts that Alypius has just proven his point that the Academicians are beat. Augustine asks--will the Academicians say you should not assent to the truth? No, they would say that the truth can be found (and if found, assented to). To find the truth, then, one must be guided by divine spirit (something Alypius said back in 3.5). Augustine returns to poetry and the image of Proteus. Proteus, in Virgil's Georgics, is a figure of truth. Proteus reminds us not to be deceived by false images nor deceived through the senses. Augustine is happy that they agree so much using Cicero's definition of frienship as "accord," he finishes by launching into a monologue.
AUGUSTINE'S MONOLOGUE
Augustine first critiques the pomposity of the Academicians.
He then moves on to critique the idea that we can't know anything by suggesting that even if we are uncertain, we still know something.
Augustine then argues that even though the Academicians argue that perception is misleading we are not wrong when we identify what we see as world. So, what seems so to us is world. Augustine argues here for a kind of univocity in that even if we are asleep or insane we are both of these things in world. The world gives us information mediated by laws--so seeing a bent bar in the water is truth because the water effects the bar and gives us certain kinds of visual information--it seems bent. If it appeared straight, we would say this is false (though what Augustine is not exactly explaining is how we know that the visual trick of the water's refracting powers is truth to begin with). Augustine calls these things that interfere as ""intervening causes"--so seeing things refracted is not "wrong" because we know about intervening causes. In other words, it doesn't seem right, but it is because of these intervening causes. Truth is external to our biases.
The senses, then, give us kinds of truth. But, Augustine asks what do they contribute to our search for truth? Augustine argues that individual senses will always give pleasure or displeasure to the individual but the highest good will still be found with the mind.
Augustine then defends dialectics in finding truth. A man can't be happy and sad. If there is one sun, then, there can't be two. The same soul couldn't not die and be immortal. Augustine returns to the problem of the Academicians and perception as it relates to wisdom. A simplified version would run: if a wise man identified something as wisdom, why would he say no to it? A wise man is assenting to more than "mere opinion" [3.14]. Wisdom isn't nothing.
Augustine goes on to argue that someone who assents to nothing, does nothing. This is a similar argument in Dante's Inferno with the Neutrals. These people did nothing in life, they stood still. In death, they are wanted neither by Heaven nor Hell and condemned to always be in motion--stung by wasps and flies, following a blank banner. For Dante, it would have been better if they would have chosen Hell than to have done nothing in life. Dante laments that there are so many. For Augustine, as well, this constant deferring of assent is as good as standing still. One must assent as part of the search for wisdom.
I'll conclude with Against the Academicians in the next post.
Augustine and Alypius get back into their argument again: does the wise man know that he knows wisdom? Alypius tries the "seems" trick again, but Augutine doesn't bite. So Alypius agrees that a wise man knows wisdom--by definition. Augustine then asks if "the wise man can be found?" [3.4.10]. If he can't be found then the debate is over, but if he can be found, all questions are settled (presumably not the "how?" however).
For Augustine what this means is that either wisdom can't be identified, and that it is nothing, or that reason, as configured in the human mind, can't detect wisdom. Alypius counters that this does not mean the whole project of the Academicians should be thrown out, their withholding of assent is still important.
Assent should not be given because someday the position one holds now can be proven false, argues Alypius. Augustine rebuts that Alypius has just proven his point that the Academicians are beat. Augustine asks--will the Academicians say you should not assent to the truth? No, they would say that the truth can be found (and if found, assented to). To find the truth, then, one must be guided by divine spirit (something Alypius said back in 3.5). Augustine returns to poetry and the image of Proteus. Proteus, in Virgil's Georgics, is a figure of truth. Proteus reminds us not to be deceived by false images nor deceived through the senses. Augustine is happy that they agree so much using Cicero's definition of frienship as "accord," he finishes by launching into a monologue.
AUGUSTINE'S MONOLOGUE
Augustine first critiques the pomposity of the Academicians.
He then moves on to critique the idea that we can't know anything by suggesting that even if we are uncertain, we still know something.
Augustine then argues that even though the Academicians argue that perception is misleading we are not wrong when we identify what we see as world. So, what seems so to us is world. Augustine argues here for a kind of univocity in that even if we are asleep or insane we are both of these things in world. The world gives us information mediated by laws--so seeing a bent bar in the water is truth because the water effects the bar and gives us certain kinds of visual information--it seems bent. If it appeared straight, we would say this is false (though what Augustine is not exactly explaining is how we know that the visual trick of the water's refracting powers is truth to begin with). Augustine calls these things that interfere as ""intervening causes"--so seeing things refracted is not "wrong" because we know about intervening causes. In other words, it doesn't seem right, but it is because of these intervening causes. Truth is external to our biases.
The senses, then, give us kinds of truth. But, Augustine asks what do they contribute to our search for truth? Augustine argues that individual senses will always give pleasure or displeasure to the individual but the highest good will still be found with the mind.
Augustine then defends dialectics in finding truth. A man can't be happy and sad. If there is one sun, then, there can't be two. The same soul couldn't not die and be immortal. Augustine returns to the problem of the Academicians and perception as it relates to wisdom. A simplified version would run: if a wise man identified something as wisdom, why would he say no to it? A wise man is assenting to more than "mere opinion" [3.14]. Wisdom isn't nothing.
Augustine goes on to argue that someone who assents to nothing, does nothing. This is a similar argument in Dante's Inferno with the Neutrals. These people did nothing in life, they stood still. In death, they are wanted neither by Heaven nor Hell and condemned to always be in motion--stung by wasps and flies, following a blank banner. For Dante, it would have been better if they would have chosen Hell than to have done nothing in life. Dante laments that there are so many. For Augustine, as well, this constant deferring of assent is as good as standing still. One must assent as part of the search for wisdom.
I'll conclude with Against the Academicians in the next post.
Thursday, October 9, 2014
Against the Academicians Book 3 [21 November 380]
I have been away from the blog for a bit; I got inundated with papers. The teaching life.
Book 3 is the longest and final book, so I am going to divide this into two, especially as there is a break for a meal about half way through the dialogue.
Augustine reports that they have come to the baths because the weather is inclement. [I love these comments because the life of the mind is so affected and entangled with the world--I feel like Augustine is making a nod to this.] He begins the discussion by appealing to search "wholeheartedly" for the truth.
The problem, he reiterates, is that the Academicians hold that the truth is so hidden that the wise-man only holds on to what is "truth-like."
They then move into a discussion of fortune. Is fortune necessary in the pursuit of wisdom? If I am unfortunate (and the examples of being blind or death are provided) would I pursue wisdom or could one? Alypius slips away and argues that if he did not have the fortune of life, he would not care for wisdom. At face value, this seems obvious, if one were dead, caring about anything is a moot point. Augustine uses this as a spring-board to argue for the difference between the seeker of wisdom (the philosopher) and the wise (one who holds wisdom). Fortune wouldn't necessarily get in the way of the seeker or the owner of wisdom. Because wisdom is greater than fortune.
Augustine then posits these 4 points: 1) there is no difference between seeker and owner except for the act of possession itself; 2) nobody can possess wisdom if they haven't learned (so, wisdom is a something, not a nothing); 3) anyone who knows nothing; learns nothing; and 4) nobody can know a falsehood. This last point is a sticky one for me--of course one can know something false. But, I think what they are advocating here is that wisdom would be something outside of the knower themselves--human error does not make something false, if it is true (or real?)
Alypius objects on the grounds of "possession;" he wants to advocate for "seeming" to. Augustine gets irritated with these semantics--to seem, he says, would indeed indicate some kind of possession. If he seems to know, then there is a something, not a nothing.
Alypius tries to pursue the gray area. He insists there is a difference between "it seems to him that he knows" and "he knows." As well, he argues, there is a difference between wisdom connected with the truth and truth itself.
Augustine, perhaps with his back to the wall here, introduces a convenient noon day meal. They adjourn and return. Book 3 has no breaks, so in the next blog I will pick up with the post-meal discussion.
Book 3 is the longest and final book, so I am going to divide this into two, especially as there is a break for a meal about half way through the dialogue.
Augustine reports that they have come to the baths because the weather is inclement. [I love these comments because the life of the mind is so affected and entangled with the world--I feel like Augustine is making a nod to this.] He begins the discussion by appealing to search "wholeheartedly" for the truth.
The problem, he reiterates, is that the Academicians hold that the truth is so hidden that the wise-man only holds on to what is "truth-like."
They then move into a discussion of fortune. Is fortune necessary in the pursuit of wisdom? If I am unfortunate (and the examples of being blind or death are provided) would I pursue wisdom or could one? Alypius slips away and argues that if he did not have the fortune of life, he would not care for wisdom. At face value, this seems obvious, if one were dead, caring about anything is a moot point. Augustine uses this as a spring-board to argue for the difference between the seeker of wisdom (the philosopher) and the wise (one who holds wisdom). Fortune wouldn't necessarily get in the way of the seeker or the owner of wisdom. Because wisdom is greater than fortune.
Augustine then posits these 4 points: 1) there is no difference between seeker and owner except for the act of possession itself; 2) nobody can possess wisdom if they haven't learned (so, wisdom is a something, not a nothing); 3) anyone who knows nothing; learns nothing; and 4) nobody can know a falsehood. This last point is a sticky one for me--of course one can know something false. But, I think what they are advocating here is that wisdom would be something outside of the knower themselves--human error does not make something false, if it is true (or real?)
Alypius objects on the grounds of "possession;" he wants to advocate for "seeming" to. Augustine gets irritated with these semantics--to seem, he says, would indeed indicate some kind of possession. If he seems to know, then there is a something, not a nothing.
Alypius tries to pursue the gray area. He insists there is a difference between "it seems to him that he knows" and "he knows." As well, he argues, there is a difference between wisdom connected with the truth and truth itself.
Augustine, perhaps with his back to the wall here, introduces a convenient noon day meal. They adjourn and return. Book 3 has no breaks, so in the next blog I will pick up with the post-meal discussion.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)